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Abstract
*
This paper explores the Commission’s use of soft law within the EU state aid
regime and how its application of informal policy instruments has evolved since
the early 1990s. It argues that developments over the past decade have led to a
“hardening” of the regulatory approach applied within the state aid regime, an
evolution which seems to run against a more general EU trend towards soft law
and “softer” forms of governance. Yet this policy development should not be
read simply a trend from hard law to soft law. Rather, the reconfiguration of
policy instruments used in the state aid regime reflects the challenges facing and
the distinctive characteristics defining this policy area. The paper thus begins by
introducing and defining soft law. It then provides an overview of the EU’s
state aid regime; of the role of discretion in the decision-making process; and of
Commission rule-making on state aid matters. The paper concludes by pointing
to two legal “events” that show how the Commission’s soft law approach has
recently changed and by analysing and drawing out some of the implications of
this development.
                                                          
*  My thanks to all those who commented on a very early draft of this paper within the
European Forum in the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, in January 2000.
Particular thanks go to Isabela Atanasiu and Angeles Mazuelos who commented on a later
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent contribution to the literature on EU governance, Eising and Kohler-
Koch (1999: 285) unpack the “complex mixture of governance models” that
characterise the EU’s policy process. They argue that “most EC policy areas are
marked by a preponderance of network governance” which rests on a “belief
that networks and consensus formation are an appropriate way of governing the
European Union” (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999: 275). This, it is claimed, is as
true for many of the EU's regulatory policies as it is, say, for redistributive
policies. Thus, while a top-down “command-and-control” approach may have
once seemed the most appropriate model of governance for regulation at the
European-level, this is no longer necessarily the case. The Commission, in
particular, has been keen to introduce softer consensus-based models of
governance, even in policy areas traditionally characterised by interventionist
and legalistic styles of decision-making (see, for example, Lenschow, 1999 on
environment policy). Part of this process of “transformation” has involved an
increasing use of informal rule-making by both EU institutions and member
states (see, for example, Klabbers, 1998; Snyder, 1993), and frequent reference
is made to how such an approach in the hands of member governments is
certain to reduce the decision-making role of the supranational institutions. One
commentator has even gone as far as to suggest that the European Union is
entering an “era of soft law” (Flynn, 1997: 2), characterised by the proliferation
of “regulation by publication” (Snyder, 1993: 3) and linked to the emergence of
the subsidiarity principle.
If such a trend towards a “softer” model of European governance does
exist, the EU’s state aid policy might at first sight appear an exception to it.
After all, this is a policy area which has long been shaped by a soft law
approach, and where “harder” legally-binding forms of regulation have been a
feature only of the 1990s. Crucial for the building and consolidation of the
internal market, state aid policy also raises extremely sensitive political issues
for the EU’s member states. As a regulatory policy, but one dependent upon the
use of informal instruments, it is something of an oddity, even in EU terms. But
it is precisely for these reasons (namely, the sensitivity and the centrality of the
policy, and its early reliance on soft law) that the state aid regime makes for an
intriguing case study.
This paper charts the context within which a soft law approach has been
applied within the European Union’s state aid regime: and more specifically,
asks whether recent developments in state aid enforcement confirm that the
policy is indeed evolving away from, rather than towards a softer form of
governance. Thus the paper begins by introducing and defining soft law, and byRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 4
summarising the arguments made both against it and in its favour. Turning to
the state aid case, there follows an overview of the distinctive characteristics of
this unusual EU regime; of the role of discretion in the decision-making
process; and of Commission rule-making on state aid matters. The paper then
presents some evidence that a “hardening” of the Commission's soft law
approach has been taking place since the early 1990s. Yet, as is spelt out in the
Conclusion, this alone does not necessarily imply the existence of a trend from
soft law to hard law, or an end to the Commission’s soft law approach. Rather,
it reflects the Commission’s desire to find an appropriate mix of policy
instruments in a regime in which the legal and economic requirement of
rigorous supranational enforcement must be weighed against the political need
for intergovernmental consensus.
THE SOFT LAW APPROACH
The origins of the Commission's soft law approach lie in the international
sphere where governments find it easier to conclude international agreements of
a (legally) soft and flexible nature than those imposing hard legal obligations
and ratification requirements. It was only from the early 1970s that the soft law
concept began to appear widely in the public law literature (Wellens and
Borchardt, 1989: 267) and this was soon picked up by those working in the field
of European legal studies (Baldwin and Houghton, 1986: 239). Even so, many
lawyers continue to deny the value of the concept. Law, they argue, is either
hard or it is not law at all. Yet despite such hostility, Wellens and Borchardt
(1989: 268) have shown how political, and possibly even legal effects can arise
from these acts which on the surface are non-binding.
So what then is “soft law”? Snyder’s definition is perhaps the clearest. He
says that soft laws are “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally
binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects” (Snyder, 1993:
2). While this definition is broad enough to encompass both an international
and an EU understanding of soft law, the latter includes not only international
agreements but also texts issued by the European institutions. In the case of
Commission soft law, the focus of this paper, the concept is best understood by
listing the forms that it takes: codes of conduct, frameworks, resolutions,
communications, declarations, guidance notes, and circulars for example. While
it is generally accepted that soft law lies somewhere between general policy
statements (and Commission discretion) on the one hand, and legislation on the
other, identifying precisely where this rather illusive concept begins and ends
can be extremely difficult. For lawyers in particular, soft law remains a highly
contested concept.RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 5
Not surprisingly, much of the (legal) literature on soft law deals with how
it affects legal doctrine, though the wider (non-legal) pros and cons of the
proliferation of these sorts of instruments is also raised in some studies (see for
example, Beveridge and Nott, 1998). It has been argued, for example, that soft
law can act as a helpful guide to officials, encouraging consistency in
bureaucratic decision-making; it can inform the public of official attitudes; it is
flexible and can be more speedily issued than legislation; it can deal with issues
of regulatory philosophy and broad policy which may not so easily be
communicated using more formal legal instruments; and it can allow for
regulation where no regulation would otherwise be possible.
Such rules inexpensively and swiftly routinise the exercise of discretion; they provide
easy justification for the use of statutory powers; the “get the job done” whilst offering
something to critics … they give a flexibility that primary legislation does not offer;
and they are largely immune from judicial review (Baldwin and Houghton, 1971: 239-
40).
This benign interpretation does little to conceal the dangers inherent in informal
rule-making. Perhaps the most damning criticism of soft law is that it results in
soft compliance: that is, as soft law is not legally binding, implementation must
rest solely on the goodwill of those agreeing to and affected by it, which some
might argue is a rather unstable foundation for policy consistency. Moreover,
when soft law is used, parliaments tend to be by-passed; its content is often
vague and non-judiciable; it may be inconsistent with existing legislation; it
tends to be inaccessible (opaque), with little scope for public input; and it can
allow judges and/or administrators a dominant role in the making of policy.
Indeed, “once political and moral concerns are allowed to creep back into the
law, the law loses its relative autonomy from politics or morality”, thus opening
the way for abuses of power (Klabbers, 1998: 391).
Two policy studies which conceive of soft law from rather different
perspectives suggest how the Commission might use a soft law approach to
serve different ends. In the first case, that of European environmental policy
(Flynn, 1997), soft law is deemed to be part of a new regulatory trend within the
European Union, one which places more emphasis than in the past on informal
rule-making and norm-setting, whilst at the same time responding to concerns
long advanced within the EU member states that the EU’s regulatory regime
imposes exceedingly heavy burdens on European non-state actors. In this case,
soft law is deemed to provide an alternative to harder forms of EU regulation.
1
This is very much connected to the application of the subsidiarity principle
which Flynn says has become tied to “a debate about styles of regulation,
sensitivity to Member States interests, and above all a leaner, meaner and moreRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 6
discreet but simultaneously effective pattern of EU regulation”(Flynn, 1997: 2).
It is in this context that the start of an era of soft law has been heralded.
Yet by contrast, in a paper by Dehousse and Weiler (1990) on European
foreign policy, a trend of a different sort is suggested, as the title “EPC and the
Single Act: From Soft Law to Hard Law?” suggests. In this case, the authors
understand soft law as a “half-way house” between discretion and legislation.
They claim that “in legitimizing certain types of behaviour, this kind of
instrument may represent an important stage in the process that leads to the
elaboration of customary international law” (1990: 5-6) and that “from a
historical viewpoint … the ‘soft law’ concept may be useful in understanding
how pragmatic arrangements have slowly crystallized into binding rules of law”
(1990: 7). More specifically, in the case of European Political Co-operation, the
forerunner of today’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, they suggest that
[…] the “soft law” construct can be regarded as a useful instrument for understanding
the radiating effect which basic EPC documents undoubtedly had in the pre-Single Act
years. Their ‘soft’ legal value can, at least in part, account for the influence political
cooperation exerted on the Member States and for the sense of comity which
developed between European partners (Dehousse and Weiler, 1990: 6).
In this case, soft law may be viewed in a number of inter-connected ways: as
symbolic policy, marking out a certain common direction without formal
commitment; as a practical solution allowing difficulties associated with
introducing more formal policy instruments to be circumvented; and as a
consequence of the sort of incrementalism which implies “small steps ahead,
bringing each time the various partners closer, and reinforcing their cohesion”
(Dehousse and Weiler, 1990: 26).
In the first case identified above, soft law is a characteristic of a
distinctive form of regulation, one which implies a softer form of governance,
resting for example on negotiated settlements and voluntarily agreed codes of
practice. To generalise from this perspective, we might expect to find, at least in
some policy areas, that a softer form of governance –based on soft law – would
come to replace or serve as an alternative to more conventional, “hard” forms of
legislation. By contrast, in the second example, soft law is conceived of as a
stepping–stone to hard law rather than as an alternative to it. Generalising from
this second perspective then, we might expect to find that softer forms of
governance eventually harden into binding legislative regimes, and that soft law
is in this sense somewhat ephemeral. While these two hypotheses are by no
means intended to cover all possible regulatory options, they do help to frame
our enquiry into the EU's state aid policy. How then should we understand the
soft law approach in this particular policy area? What do recent developmentsRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 7
in state aid enforcement tell us about the way in which this regime is governed?
Before addressing these questions directly, the following sections provide an
overview of the policy, so as to shed light on both the discretionary and rule-
making context which has helped to shape the Commission’s current approach
to enforcement in this particular area.
THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE STATE AID REGIME
The European Union’s state aid policy regulates the grant of subsidies by
national and sub-national authorities on the grounds that aid of this sort can, at
least potentially, distort competition between the EU’s member states. The
policy has been characterised by three distinctive features: its centrality to the
single European market objective; its absence of formal legislation; and its
political sensitivity. Resting on a strict notification requirement which has
become something of a burden for the Commission, the policy regulates both
regional and sectoral aids, as well as those that are horizontal in application
(addressing, for example, R&D or environmental concerns), and it rules on both
individual grants of aid and on aid schemes which establish national
frameworks of subsidisation. The Commission was endowed with discretion
and a monopoly of enforcement in this field by the EC Treaty. But even though
the formal instruments of state aid control were laid out in the 1957 Treaty of
Rome, it was only in the mid-1980s that enforcement became a Commission
priority. Piecemeal efforts to apply the treaty provisions had been made earlier,
but it was with the appointment of Peter Sutherland as Competition
Commissioner (1985-89) and his successor, Sir Leon Brittan (1989-93), that a
coherent policy began to take shape. This policy clearly formed part of the
single market logic of the time (Petersen, 1993). Indeed, state aid control is
deemed by the Commission to be a crucial element in the creation and
maintenance of free and fair competition within the European market, and is an
important part of the EU's competition regime. But though state aid policy is
clearly a regulatory policy, it is all the same a regulatory policy with a
difference.
EU state aid policy is governed by Articles 87-89 [ex. 92-94] of the
Treaty on European Union. Article 87(1) bans nationally-granted state aid and
is something of a catch-all provision. Articles 87(2) and 87(3) allow for
exemptions (or derogations) to the prohibitive rule: mandatory in the case of the
former, covering aid of a social nature granted to individuals, financial support
in the event of natural disasters, and aid to parts of Germany affected by the
division of that country; but discretionary in the case of the latter, for aid
promoting economic development in certain areas; aid for projects of a common
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in a national economy;RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 8
certain sectoral and regional aid; aid to promote cultural and heritage
conservation; and any other aid specified by a qualified majority of the Council
on the basis of a proposal from the Commission.
2 The main objective of the
policy is to reduce levels of national subsidy and avoid the damaging effects of
subsidy races within the internal market. Yet the possibility of exemption
suggests that state aid policy may be used to achieve objectives other than the
reduction of subsidy for its own sake and the creation of a level playing-field
for European industry. This is clearly the case. Regional and, though to a lesser
extent, social, environmental and industrial objectives have all been pursued
through the state aid rules, even during the ostensibly neo-liberal years of the
late 1980s, to the extent that by the early 1990s, “state aid [was] increasingly
seen as a vehicle for making the completion of the internal market politically
acceptable” (Evans and Martin, 1991: 110).
3
The Commission has a substantial freedom of manoeuvre in the taking of
state aid decisions. Until 1997 there was practically no Council legislation at all
in this policy area.
4 Commission policy derived from the Treaty, from Court
Judgements and from the Commission's own rules and experience, and while
Article 89 [ex. 94] did allow the Council of Ministers to issue state aid
regulations which might add flesh to the bare bones of the Treaty, this was
dependent upon a Commission proposal (Sinnaeve, 1998). Until the late 1990s
no such regulation was agreed by the Council and after 1972 no proposals were
made by the Commission. As a result, the Council has been seated very much
on the sidelines of what was and still remains a Commission policy. We might
even argue that a Commission--Court relationship has replaced the more
conventional inter-institutional policy-making triangle of Commission,
Parliament and Council in this policy area (Goyder, 1988). Moreover, the
absence of state aid legislation led, as we shall see below, to the construction of
a body of informal Commission rules which served as a substitute for “hard”
legislation.
The policy's distinctiveness also stretches to the state aid decision-making
process. This is in certain respects similar to that found in the Commission's
antitrust rules, though without the same sweeping powers of investigation. The
decision-making procedure rests on the opening of what is known as the
“contentious” (or the Article 88(2) [ex. 93(2)]) procedure. This follows an
initial and less formal preliminary investigation. Whereas at this first stage,
officials decide if the national authorities have a case to answer, a full
investigation of the aid measures granted has to wait until a contentious
procedure is initiated. While in theory this procedure should conclude with a
legally binding decision, in fact very few of these are taken. Informal
settlements are very much the norm, not least because national authorities areRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 9
aware that once a procedure is opened, the Commission is more likely to take a
negative than a positive decision. Where a decision is taken it generally spells
out why the subsidy in question is deemed a “state aid” under the Treaty and
why the treaty derogations do or do not apply in this case. It also includes
information on the nature of the measure, the extent to which it distorts
competition and its effect on inter-state trade within the Union.
Much more than its decision-making procedure however, the
distinctiveness of state aid policy is tied to the function it performs. It is one of
the most politicised of the EU's regulatory policies, as Commission decisions
can, in a very blatant manner, prevent national governments from pursuing their
own (national) industrial policies. This is after all a policy area which pits the
Commission directly against the member states, with governmental authorities
rather than firms, the targets of Commission regulation. While EU governments
in principle agree that a state aid regime is necessary for the fair and effective
functioning of the single market, this does not stop them contesting both
Commission policy and Commission decisions in individual cases of aid
particularly when national or governmental interests are perceived to be at
stake. This point is crucial as it demonstrates the fine line that the state aid
officials tread when vigorously enforcing a policy which is both central to the
single market objective, and highly sensitive politically. To assist it in this
difficult task the Commission has drawn up its own state aid rules. Before
turning to these rules, the following section provides a more detailed account
the state aid decision-making process and the instances of discretion to be found
within it. It is these instances of discretion which form the decision-making
context within which, in this policy area, the Commission’s soft law approach
has evolved.
DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING IN THE STATE AID REGIME
Just as the concept of discretion makes little sense without some understanding
of the importance of rules, it is only through the discretionary character of the
state aid decision-making process, that the rule-making function of the
Commission in this policy area can be explained. The section that follows thus
reviews the state aid decision-making process from this perspective. More
specifically, it serves to highlight the function performed by discretion within
the decision-making process. For example, discretion might be used as a means
of dealing with complex cases for which rules are difficult to draft; it could be
endowed in an authority when another rule-making body (or legislature) is
unable to agree on appropriate rules; or it might be granted to a body to enable
it to develop rules on the basis of its own experience. It is only by lookingRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 10
empirically at decision processes that the function of discretionary decision-
making in this particular policy case may be identified.
The Preliminary Investigation
Article 88 [ex. 93] of the EC Treaty obliges the EU’s member states to inform
the Commission of any new state aid about to be granted, or of any changes to
be made to existing aid. It is this system of prior notification which has formed
the basis of the Commission’s state aid regime and which triggers the
preliminary stage of the decision-making process.
5 In many cases a more
informal process of notification precedes the preliminary investigation however.
Member states sound out state aid officials on their likely reaction to a planned
measure which they believe to be relevant to or exemptible under the aid rules.
Aid which comes to the DG’s attention in this way will have to be formally
notified if it is to be introduced.
Once a formal notification has been received and acknowledged by the
Commission the first question the rapporteur in charge of the case must ask is
whether the measure is in fact a state aid. Usually it is, as the definition of an
aid is broad enough to encompass almost all forms of government assistance.
There are however a number of conditions that must be fulfilled when
determing the compatibility of a measure under the state aid rules (Quigley,
1993), namely: that the measure in question has been granted through state
resources; that it distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods; and that it affects trade
between the member states. While in the majority of cases the rapporteur
reaches a decision with ease at this stage, there can occasionally be difficult
issues to contend with. Those involving the relationship between governments
and state-owned firms, for example, can be particularly problematic (Hancher,
1994). Yet it is often in grey areas such as these that the Commission’s
discretion is most visible.
A principle which helps to guide Commission decision-making in such
cases is known as the “market investor principle” (sometimes called the “private
commercial investor principle”) (Bernitsas, 1993). The principle spells out that
it is only when the state acts as would a private investor can a measure (such as
an injection of capital) not classed as a state aid. In a 1996 case, for example,
when considering aid of eighty-seven billion pesetas to the Spanish state-
holding company, Teneo, for investment in the Spanish airline, Iberia, the
Commission raised no objection as it claimed that the market investor principle
had been satisfied (Commission, 1996, point 196). In some cases, the
operationalisation of the principle has been contentious given that decisionsRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 11
must ultimately be taken on the basis of hypothetical assumptions. In what, for
example, would a private investor invest? The answer to this question is rarely
self-evident as political, social or philanthropic factors may be taken into
consideration even by decision-takers in the private sector?
Assuming that a state aid is said to exist, the second question asked at this
stage is whether the aid is likely to fall under any of the Article 87 [ex. 92]
exemption clauses. This question is addressed in a fairly informal manner,
though where there are any doubts the aid must not be approved. The European
Court of Justice made this perfectly clear in the Cook case (C-198/91) in 1991.
Yet state aid officials are so adept at dealing with notifications that an initial
reading of the relevant paperwork is often enough to allow conclusions to be
drawn about a measure’s compatibility with the aid rules. There is thus no need
for a step-by-step analysis in any formal sense. It should not be forgotten that
the majority of work done by the state aid directorate is in effect the rubber-
stamping of notifications that do not in any way infringe the treaty provisions.
We should not be surprised that routine decisions do not get a great deal of
attention however, as these cases are never as exciting as the infrequent yet
more high-profile state aid controversies.
There are occasionally borderline cases where the legality of an aid is a
matter for debate of course. But even here the decision to approve an aid, or that
which opens a full investigative procedure under Article 88 [ex. 93](2) has more
to do with the gut-feelings of the rapporteur than with any detailed economic or
legal analysis (Evans and Martin, 1991). This is not to imply that the decision is
an arbitrary one (Kobia, 1996). The state aid staff have a great deal of
experience of dealing with individual cases and there is always the threat of a
Court appeal hanging over the Competition DG should an unlawful decision be
taken. If there is any concern about the effects of a measure there must be a full
investigation. The preliminary investigation is just that – preliminary and
impressionistic. There are so many cases to deal with at this stage that it would
be impossible for it to be otherwise. There is, even so, an inherent ambivalence
about the state aid procedures at this early stage. With state aid so broadly
defined, and with the number of notifications required by the Commission so
large, officials seek to dispose of the routine-type notifications as quickly as
possible so as to concentrate on the most important cases, that is, those deemed
priorities. Thus the preliminary investigation has performed a function
bureaucratically that a more selective legal framework would have achieved
more formally, and discretion plays an important part in this process. As we
shall see, however, this method of dealing with an ever-growing state aid case-
load has proven inadequate, and since the end of the 1990s an alternative means
of prioritising decision-making has been found.RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 12
Time limits are often a serious source of contention at this stage and
indeed remain so throughout the entire procedure. Also increasingly contentious
is the position of competitor firms (and other third parties) who have little input
at the preliminary stage. So although the preliminary investigation into a state
aid may be considered as routine and uncontroversial discretionary decisions
are taken at this stage: to define an aid; to frame the content of the proposal (this
may colour the reading of the case higher up the hierarchy); and to propose the
initiation of the second stage in the state aid procedure. However, these
decisions are not well documented, interests are unlikely to be involved and
general information is hard to come by.
The “Contentious” or Article 88(2) [ex. 93(2)] Procedure
Once a preliminary investigation has been completed, the state aid directorate
must decide if there is a case to answer and whether doubts about the aid’s
compatibility with the treaty provisions still exist. If there are doubts, the formal
proceedings under Article 88(2) [ex. 93(2)] are initiated. This decision to
investigate a case further is clearly an instance of discretion in the state aid
procedure.
The opening of the Article 88 [ex. 93](2) procedure means that decision-
making enters a more public domain, and this in turn implies that a statement is
being made about the importance of a case – whether in political, legal or
economic terms. With limited resources the state aid directorates do not have
the capacity to pursue all aid cases through to final decision. Increasingly the
Commission has come to recognize the importance of prioritizing its formal
investigations (Commission, 1995, point. 395) in order to use its decision-
making capacity strategically. For example, it was stated in its Twenty-Fifth
Report (1996, point 209) that the contentious procedure had been opened in a
number of internationalization schemes “[t]o establish a clear policy in this
field”.
This second stage in the decision-making process involves a much more
in-depth appraisal of the aid in line with criteria set out in the Treaty, in case-
law and in policy guidelines. It also involves some consultation with the
member states. The “compensatory justification” principle underpins the
Commission’s decision-taking at this point. This principle which involves the
weighing up of the pros and cons of an aid has been applied with vigour ever
since it was confirmed by the European Court in the Philip Morris (Holland)
judgement of 1980 (Case 730/79), although in practice it has shaped
Commission decision-making since the 1960s (Mortelmans, 1984). The
approach was initially spelt out in the Commission’s First Report onRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 13
Competition Policy in 1972, though perhaps its clearest statement came in the
Tenth Report on Competition Policy, where it was stated that:
if the Commission has to use its discretionary power not to raise objections to an aid
proposal, it must contain a compensatory justification which takes the form of a
contribution by the beneficiary of aid over and above the effects of the normal play of
market forces to the achievement of Community objectives as contained in the
derogations of Article 88 [ex. 92] (3)EEC (Commission, 1981, point 213).
It is clear therefore that the regulation of state aid allows for the balancing of
the effects of legal certainty against a more flexible approach. The
compensatory justification principle opens the door to a qualitative cost-benefit
analysis undertaken by the state aid staff, within which the losses to European
competition and the single market are balanced against gains associated with
other policy objectives, most notably those that contribute to the cohesion of the
Union.
At this second stage in the proceedings third parties do have certain
rights. But while member governments are kept informed of cases through their
Permanent Representations in Brussels, competitor firms often find it difficult
to get hold of useful information. A rather sketchy and unhelpful summary is
published in the EU’s Official Journal, as the Commission is extremely cautious
about publishing information which could be commercially sensitive. This
leaves most competitors having to seek redress through the courts as a last
resort as did British Airways and six other airlines in the Air France case
decided in 1998 (Graham and Iskander, 1998). Thus the final decision taken by
the Commission always has to be sound enough for it to stand up in court on
appeal, though many would argue that this does not necessarily mean that it is
either well-reasoned or particularly detailed (Bishop, 1997). A shoddy, speedily
drafted and poorly investigated decision will certainly involve some risk that
the case will be overturned. But on the other hand, the Courts may also penalize
the Commission, possibly by refusing to allow aid already distributed to be
recovered if there is too great a delay in issuing a decision.
Before a final proposal is issued by the Competition DG, drafts are
transmitted up the DG hierarchy and are often returned to the rapporteur for
reworking. In all but the most routine cases, the staff in Directorate A which
oversees all aspects of competition policy will vet the proposal before it is
passed on to the staff of the Competition Commissioner (the cabinet). Other
Commission services also get the opportunity to view the proposal when it
enters interservice consultation. The draft is circulated to interested DGs (and
will as a matter of course go to the Legal Service) and if there are any serious
problems an interservice meeting may be held to try to iron them out.RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 14
At the end of the second stage the DG will recommend the issuing of
either a positive, a negative or a conditional decision. Conditional decisions,
such as in the decision on aid to French computer firm Bull in 1994 might
include restrictions on the type, amounts, intensity, beneficiaries, purposes
and/or duration of the aid (Commission, 1994, point 396). While most
procedures do not end in formal decisions (Pijnacker Hordijk, 1985), since the
mid-1980s an increasing number have been taken each year. In 1995, for
example, twenty-two positive final decisions, nine negative final decisions and
five conditional final decisions were taken. Back in 1982, by contrast, no final
decisions were taken under Article 88 [ex. 93](2) and in 1983 there were only
five in all. Indeed, most aid cases still end in informal settlements which either
involve modifications to the aid proposal, or its complete withdrawal if
Commission approval is unlikely. All the same it can still be said with some
confidence that “[v]ery few grants of aid are approved by the Commission once
it has decided to initiate the procedure in Article 92” (Cownie, 1986: 262).
Member governments are well aware of this.
The decision to take a formal and enforceable decision is arcane but
important. Indeed, it is perhaps the most crucial discretionary step in the
decision-taking process as without formal decisions there would be less scope
for appeals and very little case-law. While the informal procedure may well
resolve the problem of having to deal with an individual grant of aid, it makes
little contribution to the broader legal and policy framework. This policy-
making objective necessitates the formality of decision-making and links, as we
shall see, the Commission’s role in individual cases to its rule-making function.
Decision-taking in the College of Commissioners
Although draft decisions are drawn up by the staff of the state aid directorate,
final state aid decisions, in all but routine cases, are taken by the College of
Commissioners. This leaves open the possibility that at the final stage in the
Commission procedure bargains will be struck over the content of the decision.
The importance of bureaucratic politics in state aid decision-taking should not
be understated. Indeed, within the College itself there is scope for the exercise
of a form of discretion in the taking of state aid decisions, with the proviso that
the decision must be able to stand up in any appeal to the Courts. Even so, it is
clear that the College has been able to profit from the ECJ’s support for
Commission discretion in the past to unpack proposals put before it. As has
been noted, the Court’s “kid-glove” standard of review (Bernitsas, 1993, 117)
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It would be misleading however to conceive of the involvement of the
College as an entirely separate stage in the state aid decision-making process.
Likewise it would be wrong to assume that it is at this stage alone that political
imperatives become important. Rather, the involvement of the Commissioners’
offices can begin early on in the decision-making process and can impact upon
all the discretionary instances identified above. However, this is only likely
when a decision is identified as controversial in one or more member states, and
where differences of opinion emerge amongst Commissioners. Inter-service
consultations which are a necessary part of the “contentious” procedure flag up
any proposal which is likely to be controversial. As such, cabinet members will
be alerted early on to any case which is likely to be problematic. They will then
try to prepare the ground in advance, taking steps to minimize the likelihood of
a clash wherever possible. Informal soundings-out of fellow cabinet members
will suggest which Commissioners are likely to oppose the Competition line,
and which will support it. It may be clear early on that opponents will have a
majority in the College, or that their opposition will be ineffective.
Formally, the draft decision will be discussed in a number of forums. The
special chefs meetings are the meetings of cabinet officials responsible for
specific policy areas, one of which is state aid. These meetings serve to iron out
difficulties whilst confirming the official line of the cabinets/Commissioner for
the record. At the chefs de cabinet meeting, the heads of the cabinets may also
have an opportunity to review the proposed decision, once again confirming
areas of disagreement and possibly deciding that the issue is controversial
enough to be discussed in the weekly Commissioners’ meeting.
The desired image of unity that the College often attempts to project
convinces few when it comes to high-profile state aid cases, and the financial
press are adept at uncovering disagreements of this sort within the College.
These conflicts often emerge around three poles: around preferences for state
interventionism as against market solutions to policy problems (ideological
differences); around multi-faceted national cleavages (territorial differences);
and around sectorally informed preferences, often manifesting themselves as
departmental disagreements (functional differences). However, these
distinctions are in practice blurred and often indistinguishable one from the
other. Governments regularly put pressure on “their” Commissioner(s) to follow
the “national” line. In any case, some Commissioners choose to do so with little
encouragement necessary. It was argued in 1991, for example, that President
Delors’ opposition to Commissioner Brittan’s demand that aid to Renault be
repayed was more to do with national sentiment than respect for the aid rules
(Cini and McGowan, 1998). Indeed, the process of decision-taking in
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Ministers (Peterson, 1995), with bargaining, log-rolling and consensus-building
part-and-parcel of the Commission’s decision-taking process. This is not
peculiar to the state aid domain, although it is perhaps less surprising that the
Commission should seek to recreate itself as a pseudo-Council in this particular
policy area given the marginal involvement of the Council in state aid matters.
The mid-1990s were dominated by a number of high profile aid cases
affecting the airline industry (Jones, 1996). These cases were judged by
competitors and the media to demonstrate the extent to which the Commission
was “under the thumb” of national governments keen to see a soft line taken
with their “national” carriers. The Commission, meanwhile, claimed that aid
granted to these companies fell under the aid rules, given the restructuring plans
they had submitted to the Commission. However, the opacity of the rules and
the decision-making process more broadly made it difficult to demonstrate
unequivocally, first, that the decisions taken were in fact covered by the aid
rules, and second, the extent to which the final decisions were determined
(politically) at the level of the College (rather than by officials within the DG on
the basis of technical criteria). Not surprisingly, this lack of transparency opens
the door to accusations that political factors outside the scope of the rules
played a large part in aid approval and the June 1998 ECJ judgement which
condemned the form rather than the substance of the Commission decision (on
aid to Air France) did little to alter this perception (Graham and Iskander,
1998). Nevertheless, it is clear that it is largely at the level of the College that
both internal and external political pressures are placed on the Commission.
This is the case whether the Competition DG’s line ultimately wins the day or
not.
It should be noted however that although attention has focused here on
the decision-taking role of the College, increasingly decisions ostensibly taken
by the College are in fact issued by means of an accelerated procedure.
"In all areas where the Commission’s discretionary power is circumscribed by precise
assessment criteria which are laid down in notices, guidelines and communications to
Member States, decisions on schemes or cases are usually taken by way of delegation
of powers, by the Member of the Commission responsible for state aid. Today, this
amounts to 45% of all decisions in the field of state aid (Mederer, 1997)".
Such delegation within the Commission sees the College of Commissioners as
well as the Council marginalised within the decision-taking process. In such
cases, which have an important bearing on the discussion below, it is the
responsible DG staff and the Commissioner for Competition, rather than the
Commission as a whole, become the de facto state aid decision-makers.RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 17
******
This section of the paper has provided an overview of the state aid decision-
making process and the instances of discretion within it. Without this it would
be difficult to understand the rule-making dimension of the policy as it is spelt
out below. Three functions of discretion, each of which has implications for our
understanding of Commission rule-making in this policy area. First, discretion
allows for the translation of broad policy principles into practice. As we shall
see below, these policy principles are set out in Commission texts, the
Competition Reports, Commissioners’ speeches and, more pertinently, in policy
guidelines. Second, discretion allows policy objectives to be attained through a
process of prioritisation and a mix of informal and formal decision-making.
This mix is only made possible because of the discretionary capacity of
Commission staff. The policy objectives, however, are found in Commission
documentation, rules which bind the Commission more than it does those
affected by the policy. Third, discretion allows politics to play a role in
decision-making. This is controversial for those who believe that this permits
the subvertion of both stated policy objectives and the principles underpinning
them. Rules which limit discretion thus limit this potential for subversion, with
the aim of removing politics from the decision-making process. So, although the
focus in this section has been on the discretion and decision-making, it serves to
set the scene for the rest of the paper in which the focus of attention lies more
specifically with the Commission rule-making and its ‘soft law approach’.
RULE-MAKING IN THE STATE AID REGIME
Since the early 1970s there has been a gradual increase in the use of soft law
instruments in the EU’s state aid regime. Taking the form of guidelines,
frameworks, communications, codes and even at times letters, soft law has been
used to clarify the Commission's approach to nationally granted aid and to
structure discretion in this policy area (della Cananea, 1993). Although there is
no doubt that EU state aid policy is now “rule-based” (Kobia, 1996), there
should be no presumption that the policy will always be consistent. Indeed, “no
one could, for a moment, assume that in an area as highly charged by political
and social considerations as state aids policy that one could expect the
Commission to apply a rigid, formalistic or mechanistic approach to controlling
national state aids” (Hancher et al., 1993: 10). Without guidelines however the
potential for political decision-making would be all the greater. The
Commission would have only the Treaty and the relatively limited body of state
aid case law to work with and enforcement would rely solely on a case-by-case
analysis of individual aid (della Cananea, 1993: 63). Even by the early 1970s
such an ad hoc approach to state aid control was deemed unworkable. In a
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direct comparisons of individual decisions would have inevitably led to political
wrangling, making the Commission’s job almost impossible (Bishop, 1997).
Frank Rawlinson, when serving as a Principal Administrator in the
Commission's state aid directorate, made a similar point:
"Experience has shown that aid levels tend to rise if there are no hard-and-fast rules
but only a vaguely formulated policy. There is nothing easier for the State aid
controller than to allow a few percent more this time, a few percent more next time,
and so on. The Commission needs rules to discipline itself. Rules are the best
safeguard against political decisions which, if they were to proliferate, would destroy
all state aid control" (Rawlinson, 1993: 58).
While the point is well taken, guidelines themselves may also be contentious.
Not only have there been bitter disagreements between the Commission and
member governments, as in the case of the Motor Vehicles Framework (below),
but there have also been disputes within the Commission itself. For example,
when the state aid officials sought to draft an aid framework for the audio-
visual sector early in the 1990s, their efforts ran up against opposition from
other Commission services who objected to the Competition DG's
“technocratic” approach in this culturally important policy area (Rawlinson,
1993: 55).
The absence of a formal framework beyond that provided by the Treaty
opened up a regulatory space which soft law was able to fill. The Commission
had originally sought to persuade the Council to regulate in this area on two
occasions: once in 1966 when a Commission proposal on state aid procedure
was drafted; and subsequently in 1972 when a Council Regulation covering a
number of regional aid issues was discussed. The strategy failed in both cases
and the Commission gave up on this approach. Instead, it began to rely more
and more heavily on its own informal rule-making capacity, with the drafting of
state aid guidelines coming to serve as an alternative to a more conventional
form of EU regulation. By the early 1990s, the Commission was not only
resigned to the absence of a Council Regulation, but was also arguing
vehemently against making further proposals in the face of increasing calls by
academics and practitioners for a more formal set of state aid rules.
Rawlinson (1993) explains why such a soft law approach came to be so
attractive for the Commission. He highlights the time-saving potential of
guidelines, that is, their value in speeding up decision-taking and reducing
backlogs. He also notes their contribution to the goals of transparency, legal
certainty and the credibility of state aid enforcement, as well as to their scope
for tightening the control of aid levels. Yet while these goals could have been
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flexibility on the one hand, and policy stability and credibility on the other, that
ultimately made soft law the instrument of choice within the state aid
directorate. Choosing a soft law approach, then, became less about making the
best of a bad situation, and more about finding a compromise between the
rigidities of hard law and the uncertainties associated with a more discretionary
approach.
1971 saw the start of the soft law era in the state aid regime, with the
drafting of rules on aid to the textiles and clothing industry. There followed a
series of guidelines devised for problem sectors such as coal and steel,
6 and
over time rules on regional aid, on horizontal categories of aid (such as aid for
investment, capital injections and environmental protection) and, though to a
lesser extent, on procedural issues (such as aids deemed to be of minor
importance – known as de minimis aid) have also been drawn up. These
guidelines take many different forms. Some, for example, lay out special
notification rules and reporting requirements, while others provide guidance for
calculating grant equivalencies or on the criteria the Commission will use in
determining the eligibility of an aid. Most list the activities for which subsidies
are permitted, and include data on maximum permissible aid levels (Rawlinson,
1993: 55). In the case of the Commission’s policy on Research and
Development Aid, for example, the current Framework which came into force
in 1996
7 is a revision of a Framework drafted a decade earlier, and is again up
for review and renewal in 2001.
8 The Framework spells out the application of
the state aid rules to R&D aid; the compatibility of R&D aid with the common
market; the notification procedures necessary; and the “allowable intensity” and
“required incentive effect”, these being the main criteria used by the
Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid (Núñez Müller, 1999:
104). The 1996 guidelines are actually quite similar to those drafted in 1985,
but were adjusted to take on board policy recommendations made in the
Commission's 1993 White Paper on Growth and the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement) which is part of the 1994
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement (Núñez Müller, 1999: 102-3).
This pattern is common. Over time there is a gradual formalisation of
both substantive policy and procedures: the translation of both Commission
practice in individual decisions and of court judgements into criteria; the
translation of those criteria into policy statements and guidelines; and the
constant updating, clarification and/or tightening of criteria within those
guidelines often on the basis of a changing policy context. Yet until very
recently this process of formalisation stopped short of hard law. We might
question whether this really matters given that from the state aid official’s
perspective, there may be little difference in practice between guidelines thatRSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 20
take the form of legislation and those of a softer kind: in other words it is not
legal form, but substantive provisions that are relevant in the application of
state aid policy (Rawlinson, 1993: 59). This is not an argument most state aid
lawyers would ascribe to of course. The uncertain legal effects of soft law have
long posed puzzles for lawyers working in this area and while the European
Courts have gone some way towards clarifying some of these issues, there are
still many legal questions that remain unanswered.
One such question concerns the legal base upon which the guidelines
rest. While some guidelines have no legal base at all, others rely expressly on
Article 88(1) [ex 93(1)]. This is the provision which requires that the
Commission monitor “existing aid” and which allows it to propose “appropriate
measures” to the member states. Yet it has been pointed out that the
appropriateness of these measures (that is, of the guidelines, frameworks etc.)
is doubtful given that it is not only existing aid that is subject to Commission
soft law.
9 Moreover, it has also been claimed that it is the voluntary nature of
the Commission’s guidelines, the fact that the member states agree to abide by
them, that has allowed for such a quasi-legal approach (Hancher, 1994: 42). The
Commission does indeed consult with member state representatives in
multilateral meetings, and circulates written drafts of guidelines before issuing
them, but consultation does not give member governments a veto. Indeed, since
the early 1990s and the after-effects of the first Motor Vehicles Framework, the
Commission has made it clear that it is willing to impose its guidelines on
unwilling member states if necessary. Indeed, the Motor Vehicles case is the
first of two legal events which demonstrate how the Commission’s use of soft
law instruments has evolved over the course of the 1990s.
THE EVOLVING SOFT LAW APPROACH
The Commission has long recognised the strategic importance of the motor
vehicles sector to the European economy. Increasingly concerned about the
massive subsidies being granted to the industry and by the effect that this was
having both on competition within the internal market and on competitiveness
beyond it, the Commission decided in December 1988 to adopt a set of
guidelines, the Community Framework on State Aid to the Motor Vehicle
Industry.
10 Initially expected to enter into force on 1 January 1989, the
Framework required Community vehicle and engine manufacturers to notify to
the Commission all awards of aid over ECU 12 million which were to be
granted under schemes already approved, and to provide the Commission with
an Annual Report of all aid, no matter how small, granted to the motor vehicle
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Ten of the then twelve EC member states accepted the Commission's
Framework (if not until mid-1989): however, two states, Spain and Germany,
did not. Although both Spanish and German opposition to the Framework
revolved around its industrial policy implications, the arguments advanced by
these two member states were very different. Thus while the German authorities
disapproved of what they saw as the Framework's sectoral industrial policy
objectives which, they claimed, would threaten the effectiveness of German
regional policy, the Spanish asserted that they would approve the Framework
only if the Commission went further than it already had in developing a fully-
fledged industrial policy for the sector. The Commission rejected both
positions. To the Spanish they made it clear that there could be no preconditions
for the application of the Framework, while in response to the German claim
that the Framework offered a backdoor route to a Community industrial policy,
the Commission dismissed this argument as incomprehensible (Commission,
1990: 129-30).
As both states continued to refuse to abide by the Framework, the
Commission opened a “contentious” procedure under Article 88 (2) [ex. 93(2)]
of the Treaty. It wasn't long however, early in 1990 in fact, before the Spanish
authorities gave in to Commission pressure, faced with the threat that all their
approved aid would be subject to a thorough re-evaluation.
11 The German
authorities continued to hold out and the Commission's procedure concluded in
February 1990 with a formal and legally-binding negative decision.
12 The
decision set out the background to the dispute, listed the (thirteen) reasons why
the German authorities opposed the framework and dealt with the German
objections one-by-one. Noting the direct effect of Article 87(2) [then 93(2)], but
also the fact that this provision cannot be applied retroactively, the Commission
required the German government to notify all aid under the Framework from 1
May 1990, with the warning that if they did not, aid granted after this date
would be deemed illegal and would thereby be subject to eventual repayment.
The Article 88(2) procedure had ostensibly been initiated in respect of all
approved aid schemes available to the motor industry in Germany. However in
practice the decision dealt only with the application of the Framework. This was
something new. The Article 87(2) [ex. 93(2)] procedure had never before been
used to compel a member state to abide by obligations contained within a
Commission soft law instrument. State aid decisions normally spell out the
compatibility or incompatibility of an aid or aid scheme in terms of the existing
state aid rules. But here the Commission decision seemed to impose a
Commission soft law instrument on a reluctant member state. It did this by
restating, in the form of a legally-binding decision, the obligations required by
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informal rule, one resting on the voluntary acquiescence of the EU's member
governments.
The decision thus marked the beginning of a new Commission policy, a
shift in the Commission's soft law approach. Indeed, since the adoption of the
German decision, the Commission has pursued a similar line of reasoning in
other cases.
13 It is now clear that the Commission is prepared to use the more
formal legal instruments at its disposal to impose its informally-made guidelines
on reluctant member states, even if it has been argued that should a majority of
member states oppose the introduction of a soft law instrument the Commission
would be unlikely to pursue such an approach (D'Sa, 1988: 33). In a sense, the
Commission needs the political weight of the consenting member states behind
it to justify this more heavy-handed enforcement of its own rules. As for the
German authorities, their eventual acquiescence and acceptance of the
Framework led, in a later version of Framework, to a statement that the decision
taken in 1990 was no longer to be considered valid. Once compliance was
assured, then, there was no further need for the hard law instrument. It is still
too early to say whether member state opposition to other soft law instruments
will be quelled as a result of such moves, even if this is the motivation behind
the Commission’s new approach.
While the Commission's approach in the Motor Vehicles case was very
much in line with the general policy thrust of toughening up state aid
enforcement characteristic of the 1990s (Brittan, 1989), the second legal event
which offers evidence of an evolving soft law approach in the state aid field can
be read as a consequence of the revitalised Commission regime. As we have
seen, the Commission had earlier resisted pressure to draft Council Regulations
under Article 89 [ex. 94]. Yet in what appears as a rather dramatic U-turn by the
Commission in the late 1990s, two Council Regulations were proposed and
subsequently approved. The first, agreed in May 1998, is a so-called “enabling”
regulation which gives the Commission the authority to exempt entire
categories of aid from the notification requirement (known as a “group” or
“block” exemption): that is, it allows the Commission to issue its own
regulations within limits established by the Council.
14 The second Council
Regulation, approved in March 1999, codifies the decision-making procedures
that apply to state aid policy (Sinnaeve, 1999).
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These two regulations were proposed largely for pragmatic reasons and
were very much the personal projects of the then Competition Commissioner,
Karel Van Miert. In the case of the first Regulation, the impulse behind the shift
in policy was clearly the state aid regime's changing institutional context. It
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rely on the taken-for-granted support of the European Courts in state aid
appeals. Driven initially by the Court of First Instance, both Courts came to
make increasing demands on the Commission in terms of the detailed
information that they required in state aid decisions, a development that was
bound to have an impact on the Commission's already stretched resources.
Moreover, the Commission was in some measure a victim of its own success. It
had publicised and enforced its policy with the aim of encouraging a culture of
complaint amongst the European business community. But over the course of
the 1990s, complaints seemed to be made as much against the Commission (for
failure to act, or in opposition to its authorisation of certain aids) as against
competitor firms (Rawlinson, 1993: 56). Finding it hard to cope with the
increased workload on both of these counts and suffering an effective cap on
resources, the Commission sought to off-load its more routine cases. This was
intended to allow it not only to cope with the notification backlog, but also to
focus more of its attention on new and priority policy areas, on the banking and
insurance sectors for example.
In the case of the second Regulation which formalises state aid
procedures, the impulse behind the legislation came in part from the legal
community who had long been pushing for greater transparency and legal
certainty in matters procedural. The Procedural Regulation is a trade-off in two
senses. First, it allows the Commission more investigative powers as well as
assurances that its negative state aid decisions ordering the recovery of aid will
not be blocked in member state courts. At the same time, the member states get
the time limits for decision-taking that they were keen to have. Second, and for
this paper most importantly, it gave the Commission the capacity to constrain
the activism of the Court of First Instance. The CFI’s line on state aid
procedural matters has been consistently tougher than that of the ECJ (see in
particular the Sytraval case). The Procedural Regulation may well limit the
freedom of manoeuver of the Commission, but to a lesser extent than would
future CFI judgements (or so the Commission surmises). But what are the
implications of this policy development?
Both the recent agreement of the two Council Regulations and (though to
a lesser extent) the developments surrounding the Motor Vehicles case, would
seem to support the view that what we are witnessing within the state aid regime
is a trend from soft law to hard law. The hardening of state aid soft law, whether
in the form of Council and Commission regulations or individual Commission
decisions suggests then that soft law serves as a sort of stepping-stone between
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Yet a closer look at the Motor Vehicles case in particular suggests a
rather different conclusion. In this case, hard law does not replace soft law, but
serves as a supplement to it. Hard law helps to ensure compliance where a more
consensus-based approach has proven inadequate. Moreover, it serves as a kind
of shadow of hierarchy which compels member state authorities to seek
consensus, in the knowledge that an alternative to consensus-formation exists
should an agreement not be reached. Qualified majority voting in the Council
can serve very much the same purpose. It would seem, then, that soft law now
serves at least two functions in the state aid regime: it acts as both a means to a
hard regulatory end, and, when supplemented by hard law, as an end in itself.
One way in which this dual function of soft law can be clarified is by focusing
on the distinction between substantive and procedural law. Most state aid soft
law is substantive (that is, it has to do with the substance or content of the
law/policy). There are by contrast relatively few informal procedural rules
dealing with how the law/policy is made. Yet procedural guidelines do exist all
the same, in the form of the aforementioned rules on aid of minor importance
and in statements of procedural policy found in the Commission’s Annual
Competition Reports for example. It is only in substantive matters, as the Motor
Vehicles case attests, that soft law serves as a supplement to hard law. From the
Commission’s perspective, the combination of soft and hard law is designed to
ensure compliance with state aid policy whilst allowing it to retain a certain
senstitivity in dealings with national authorities within its normal consensual
practice of rule-making. In procedural matters, the situation is rather different.
Here, the Commission line on the hardening of informal practices and soft law
was driven less by its relationship with member governments, and more by an
attempt to preempt likely future constraints on the Commission’s freedom of
manoeuver by the courts, and by the Court of First Instance in particular. In
procedural matters, hard law (taking the form of the Procedural and Block
Exemption Regulations) effectively replaces the discretionary and soft law
approach which preceded it.RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 25
CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the context within which a soft law approach has been
applied and has evolved within the European Union’s state aid regime. More
specifically, it asked whether recent developments in state aid enforcement
confirm that the policy is indeed evolving away from, rather than towards a
softer form of governance, one which amongst other things relies more heavily
on the use of flexible and consensually-agreed informal policy instruments.
Thus the paper began by introducing and defining soft law. Two
conceptualisations were identified, the first of which identified soft law as
characteristic of a distinctive form of regulation. By contrast, the second
conceptualisation of soft law emphasised its temporary nature, and used the
metaphor of a ‘stepping-stone’ (to hard law) to stress this point. Turning to the
state aid case, the paper then provided evidence of the distinctive characteristics
of this unusual EU regime, thereby introducing the themes of discretion and
rule-making. In the sections that followed, an overview of the state aid decision-
making procedure highlighted the discretionary characteristics of this policy
area, while an account of Commission rule-making clarified what is meant in
this case by a ‘soft law approach’. In the final section, the paper then offered
evidence of a “hardening” of the Commission's soft law approach since the
early 1990s.
This hardening of the Commission’s approach does not, on its own, demonstrate
a trend away from soft law or indeed an end to the Commission’s soft law
approach, at least not as far as the substantive policy and the enforcement of
that policy is concerned towards hard law. In this sense soft law serves a a
supplement to hard law when a tough line on member state compliance is
deemed necessary. Yet this is only the case when substantive soft law is at
issue. In procedural matters, it is is the Commission’s relationship with the
Courts, both European and national, which has driven the “hardening” of its
rule-making. Here, loose procedural rules (and even more informal practices)
have been replaced by a more formal legalistic approach, as the Commission
seeks to circumvent the even more restrictive approach which it predicted the
Courts and the CFI in particular, would continue to take in cases of procedural
relevance. What we are witnessing in this policy are is a new mix of soft and
hard law. This comes as a response to a policy and organisational context which
since the late 1980s has placed a premium upon the effectiveness of the policy,
and which has suffered from an inexorable and largely unresourced growth in
workload as a consequence. Where the balance between soft and hard law and
the particular mix of instruments used lies, depends on a perceived need to
balance its discretion and formal freedom of manoeuver against other
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balance depends largely on the specific characteristics of the policy at hand; in
the state aid case, its centrality to the internal market objective, its absence of
formal regulation (and the particularities of the relationships with member state
and courts that follow from this) and, not least, its political sensitivity.
Moreover, even within the policy itself a distinction can be made between
the balance required by procedural and substantive aspects of the policy. This
reflects the close relationship between the Commission and the Courts, on the
one hand, and the Commission and the member states on the other – in spite of
the relative autonomy of the Commission in this policy area. Procedural
wrangling has pitched the Commission against the Courts to the extent that the
introduction of hard law (that is, the replacement of soft law by hard), though
constraining the Commission, serves to preempt more even severe constraints
that are likely to result from future Court judgements. Substantive policy issues
have raised important issues of policy effectiveness and political realism for the
Commission. In this case the move to an approach in which hard law
supplements rather than replaces soft law allows an appropriate balance to be
found between the requirements of rigorous enforcement and the desirability of
inter-governmental and inter-institutional consensus within a regime which is
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ENDNOTES
1 To say this is not to assume identical effects. This is particularly important with regard to
legal effects, as it is only when hard law is issued that individual rights which can be claimed
before a court of law are confered.
2 These discretionary derogations are paraphrased in the text. They do not include exemptions
outside Article 87 [ex. 92]. These include certain aids to the agricultural sector, to the
transport sector, to pubic sector firms, to the military industry and to the coal and steel sectors.
On the shipbuilding sector see Note 9.
3 Article 88 [ex. 93] spells out the procedure to be used in state aid cases. This provision
requires that the Commission keep under review so-called ‘existing aid’, that is, aid which has
already been authorised; it offers certain rights to third parties, allowing for judicial review in
aid cases; it grants the Council of Ministers, on the basis of a unanimous vote, the right to
derogate from Article 87 [92]; and institutes a system of prior notification. Finally, Article 89
[94] allows a qualified majority in the Council to agree regulations on the basis of a
Commission proposal after consultation with the European Parliament.
4 There are a few exceptions to the general statement that there is no secondary legislation in
the state aid field. See D'Sa (1998: xli) for a list of the legislation in force.
5 In practice, however, the requirement is extremely problematic as it relies upon the national
authorities to submit voluntarily to the scrutiny of the Commission’s state aid directorate. Not
surprisingly, non-notification is wide-spread. The Commission is able to expose unnotified
aid in a number of ways: complaints made by competitor firms and states, and information
gleaned from the financial or trade press are especially important in this respect. In the case of
aid to Crédit Lyonnais, for example, officials only learnt of the bank’s restucturing plans in
the French press. But as non-notified aid must still be assessed substantively for its
compatibility with the common market it is often in a government’s interest not to notify the
Commission, especially when approval is unlikely to be granted (see Flynn, 1993).
6 The shipbuilding case is exceptional in the sense that in this sector provision was made in
the Treaty of Rome for a Directive (that is, for hard law). The first shipbuilding aid directive
was issued in 1969. OJ L206/25, 1969. Note that aid in the agricultural and transport domains
is also subject in some cases to hard law. For the full set of Commission guidelines, see the
Commission's Competition Law in the European Communities, Volume IIA. Rules Applicable
to State Aid at 31 December 1994 (1995) and updates. See also
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/lawaid/aid3.htm#A>
7 OJ 1998 648/2
8 However it is expected that on the basis of the new Council regulation a group exemption
regulation will be drawn up for R&D aids, thus transforming soft into hard law.
9 This was discussed by Inda Bevis in a presentation made on state aid control to the European
Community Studies Association Conference in Seattle in May 1997. The following section on
the consequences of the motor vehicles framework is also drawn from part of this
presentation.
10 OJ C123/3, 18.5.89.
11 See OJ C281, 7.11.89.
12 OJ L188, 20.7.90.
13 Commission Decision of 20.12.1995 amending Spanish aid schemes for the motor vehicle
industry. OJ L119, 16.5.96. The same principle is also cited in the CIRFS case, Case C313/90
[1993] ECR I-1125.RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 28
14 Council Regulation (EC) No. 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and
93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal state
aid. OJ L142, 14.05.1998. At the time of writing the Commission was proposing regulations
under this Council Regulation for three categories of aid: aid for small and medium sized
enterprises; training aid; and aid of minor importance (de minimis aid). See, for example,
Tilmans (1999: 50).
15 Council Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty. OJ L83/1 27.03.1999.RSC 2000/35 © 2000 Michelle Cini 29
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